

Summary

„Reflexive Dispositionen: Jean-Jacques Rousseaus indeterministischer Begriff der Willensfreiheit“

by Alexander Aichele

This contribution examines Rousseau's idea of human liberty. In doing so, it is argued that Rousseau advocates a notion of indeterministic freedom of will, i.e. that liberty is a metaphysical quality assigned to humans, and cannot be reduced to a mere state of consciousness as compatibilism teaches. Starting from an examination of the liberty the *homme sauvage* has in absence of natural instincts, it is shown that the possible sources of affections of free will Rousseau assumes, namely *amour de soi-même* and *amour propre*, represent reflexive dispositions. Thereby the morally bad *amour propre* refers to individual comparative judgments, whereas the morally good *amour de soi-même* refers to universal comparative judgments. These two dispositions form the fundamental alternatives of possible determinations of will.