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Introduction

In contrast to the widespread literature on the Central and Eastern European processes of regime transition and societal transformation (hereafter summarily referred to as transformation), scholarly attention to right-wing radical or ultranationalist parties and movements in the region, their relationship with the transformation process and their impact on democratic consolidation is scattered. Sometimes analogies are drawn between the post-1989 Central and Eastern European radical right and interwar fascism, in terms of a "Weimarization" of the transformation countries and the return of the pre-socialist, ultranationalist or even fascist past. Another interpretation argues that since some Central and Eastern European party systems increasingly resemble their Western European counterparts, so does the radical right, at least where it is electorally successful.

A third line of thought states that the radical right in the region is a phenomenon sui generis, inherently shaped by the historical forces of state socialism and the transformation process and, as a result and in contrast to Western Europe, ideologically more extreme and anti-democratic while organizationally more a movement than a party phenomenon. Our text addresses these issues from a theoretical and comparative angle and, by doing so, attempts to provide a coherent and consistent approach to the phenomenon.

In particular, the paper proposes a specific approach to the comparative study of right-wing radicalism and its usefulness for explaining this phenomenon in post-socialist Europe. Various explanatory approaches to the radical right contain elements of modernization theory by arguing that right-wing radicalism is the product of waves of rapid social and cultural change in modern societies. Our paper attempts to make a more systematic use of this point. At first sight, there is some persuasive power in the argument that support for these movements and parties are an expression of “transformation costs”, i.e. an ideologically diffuse protest against rapid change and its direction. But the paper maintains that important context factors which differ sharply from those in Western Europe need to be taken into account. Among these are the range of the transformation process in the political and economic arenas, national traditions and historical configurations, as well as the cleavage structures and party systems.

For our study, eight countries from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe have been

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chosen. Some countries have taken the route to democratic consolidation (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland); others still face some (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia) or more serious (Russia) obstacles in the consolidation process. Most countries of Central Europe have a fast growing economy, whereas Bulgaria and Romania had to face a second economic crisis in the second half of the 1990s. Russia has only had one crisis but this one was unprecedented in economic world history (Wagener 2001). The countries can also be distinguished by different modes of nation building. Altogether, the choice of cases is meant to represent the variety of paths, which the post-socialist countries have taken with respect to democratic consolidation, economic development and nation-building. In the future, more East and Southeast European countries will have to be looked at to complete the picture.

Dimensions of right-wing radicalism: comparative concepts and perspectives

For a workable definition of right-wing radicalism in comparative perspective, it seems preferable to avoid the shopping list quality of most definitions (Mudde 1996: 225-248) and tie it to theoretical concepts of social change which underlie most analyses of the radical right. For example, according to William Kornhauser, right-wing radicalism can be explained by a growing lawlessness and dissolution of the social order ("anomie"), which result from atomization, and radicalization of people in modern mass society (Kornhauser 1959). Seymour M. Lipset elaborates the thesis that "fascism is basically a middle-class movement representing a protest against both capitalism and socialism, big business and big unions" (Lipset 1959). Lipset later modified this "extremism of the center" thesis in emphasizing the role of status inconsistency and relative deprivation in the mobilization of right-wing radicalism (Lipset/Raab 1978: xxiv, 581).

An explanatory approach of the success of right-wing radicalism, which explicitly dwells on these earlier works, is provided by German sociologists Erwin Scheuch and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Scheuch/Klingemann 1967: 11-29). Their model is based on the assumption that the potential for radical right-wing movements exists in all industrial societies and should be understood as a "normal pathological" condition. In all fast-growing modernizing countries there are people who cannot cope with rapid economic and cultural developments and who react to the pressures of readjustment with rigidity and closed-mindedness. Right-wing movements or parties offering political philosophies that promise an elimination of pressures and a simpler, better society, can mobilize these reactions. These philosophies do not contain just any thinkable utopia but usually a romanticized version of the nation before the first large wave of modernization. That is, the two sociologists postulate that the core of the problem consists of a specifically a-synchronous dealing with the past, especially a dissent about the evaluation of modernity in the respective societies.

All of these approaches include – implicitly or explicitly – arguments derived from modernization theory and they persuasively indicate conditions for a successful
mobilization of right-wing radicalism. But they tell rather little about the ideology of the radical right itself. It seems useful to build on modernization theory not just in terms of the societal context for mobilization but also in order to identify the core ideology of the phenomenon, not in the least because this theory might provide some conceptually grounded criteria for such analyses, which helps overcome the shopping list problem. This is not the place, however, to review the vast amount of literature on modernization theory. Generally, modernization can be understood as a growing autonomy of the individual (status mobility and role flexibility) and an ongoing functional differentiation of the society (segmentation and growing autonomy of societal subsystems) (Rucht 1994). In this light, right-wing radicalism can be defined as the radical effort to undo such social change (Minkenberg 1997b; Minkenberg 1998). The counter-concept to social differentiation is the nationally defined community; the counter-concept to individualization is the return to traditional roles and status of the individual in such a community. It is this overemphasis on, or radicalization of, images of social homogeneity, which characterizes radical right-wing thinking. The historical origins of right-wing radicalism are seen to lie in the interdependence of nation building, democratization, industrialization, and the growing importance of the natural sciences.

Most of the more conceptually grounded comparative literature on the radical right deals exclusively with parties and voting behaviour in Western democracies, for example the work of Hans-Georg Betz (Betz 1994) or Herbert Kitschelt (Kitschelt/McGann 1995). With his broadly defined concept of radical right-wing populism, Betz includes among the radical right very diverse phenomena, such as nationalist-authoritarian parties like the German 'Republikaner' and the Belgian 'Vlaams Blok', and more economically liberal, anti-tax parties such as the Scandinavian Progress Parties. But in his radical right-wing populist party family, the populist style serves as the only common denominator. Kitschelt's model, on the other hand, operates on the level of supply and demand in the political space, and argues that the new radical right succeeds to attract voters if it adopts in its ideology the "winning formula" of a mix of market liberalism and right-wing authoritarianism. This formula can foster the electoral coalition between market liberal employees and authoritarian workers, which is the new radical right's fountain of success. But market liberalism was never a key component of right-wing ideology. Instead, even where it was employed successfully like by the French Front National in the mid-eighties, it was a tactical tool to be abandoned as soon as the political winds changed and protectionism and welfare chauvinism seemed more promising (as in the 1990s).

In the light of the problems of the concepts discussed above, right-wing radicalism will be defined primarily by the ideological criteria of populist and romantic ultranationalism, a myth of a homogenous nation which puts the nation before the individual and his/her civil rights and which therefore is directed against liberal and pluralist democracy (though not necessarily in favour of a fascist state), its underlying values of freedom and equality and the related categories of individualism and universalism (Minkenberg 2000: 170-188; Mudde 2000b: chap. 7). This definition focuses explicitly on the idea of the nation as the ultimate focal point, situated somewhere between the poles of demos and ethnos. The
nationalistic myth is characterized by the effort to construct an idea of nation and national
belonging by radicalizing ethnic, religious, lingual, other cultural and political criteria of
exclusion, to bring about a congruence between the state and the nation, and to condense
the idea of nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity. Some authors insist on
including anti-system attitudes or opposition to democracy as an essential definitional
criterion (Backes/Jesse 1989; Ignazi 1992: 3-34). According to the definition used here,
right-wing radicalism is not the antithesis to democracy **per se**. Instead, by focussing on
ultranationalism instead of anti-democratic attitudes, the question of right-wing radicals’
relationship towards democracy remains open for empirical testing. To put it differently,
right-wing radicals are not necessarily in favour of doing away with democracy but they
want government by the people in terms of **ethnocracy** (Griffin 1997). Moreover, the
focus on ultranationalism instead of fascism or racism allows accounting for a wider range
of and distinctions between varieties of right-wing radicalism according to the way ethnic,
religious, cultural and other criteria of exclusion are used. Thus, fascism can be seen as
one version of right-wing radicalism and one in which violence plays an important role,
but there are also non-fascist but racist or (non-violent) ethnocentrist as well as religious-
fundamentalist versions of the phenomenon.

Next to these ideological variations, it is important to distinguish organizational or
structural variants. Starting from the concept of party or movement "families" (Beyme
1984), the issue needs to be tackled under which conditions the radical right manifests
itself rather in form of a movement than a party and to what extent other organizational
forms of the radical right support or constrain the particular organization's mobilization
efforts. The organizational variants are distinguished by their approach to institutional
political power and public resonance. Parties and electoral campaign organizations
participate in elections and try to win public office. Social movement organizations try to
mobilize public support as well but do not run for office, rather they identify with a larger
social movement (a network of networks with a distinct collective identity) and offer
interpretative frames for particular problems (Tarrow 1994). Finally, smaller groups and
sociocultural milieus operate relatively independently from either parties and larger social
movements and do not exhibit formal organizational structures but can also be
characterized as networks with links to other organizations and a collective identity which
tends to be more extreme than that of the parties or movement organizations (including
higher levels of violence). They represent a "micromobilization potential" for the radical
right (Bergmann 1994: 183-207).

**Applying the Concept to Post-socialist Europe**

The application to post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe of a concept of right-wing
radicalism which has been developed to analyze the radical right in Western democracies
rests on the assumption of a comparable political-historical framework of emerging, and
in some cases consolidating, democracies which share many political, social and cultural
legacies of European history such as Christianity and enlightenment, industrialization, the
idea of the nation-state, and the democratic reference. The countries of Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe share some of these characteristics, others do not. Therefore, the application of the model is not without problems. However, the proposed main origin of right-wing radicalism, a modernization process, is very obvious in form of the political and social transition these countries are going through.

The transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe is more far-reaching, deeper and complex than the current and previous modernization processes in the West (Beyme 1994: 12-14). First, it includes the collapse not only of political regimes but also of their legitimating ideologies. Thus, a simple return to left-wing or socialist ideas as a recourse by the "losers" of this modernization process is only a limited option. Right-wing groups or those, which combine socialist with nationalist ideas, can benefit from this constellation. Second, the democratization of regimes is accompanied by an economic and social transformation, which touches all aspects of life (thus making it different from earlier waves of democratization or "re-democratization" such as the German and Italian cases after World War II). The complexity of the transformation process produces large "transformation costs" which can benefit the radical right. Third, the exchange of entire social systems causes high levels of social disorientation and ambivalence towards the new order. Again, political entrepreneurs who offer simple solutions and appeal to the "people" or nation rather than a particular social class or universalist vision of progress have a competitive advantage.

In sum, these transformation-induced opportunity structures, which lie behind the institutional settings of liberal democracy as they are put into place in most Eastern European countries must be seen as generally favourable to ultranationalist appeals of the radical right. It is also clear that these processes are fundamentally different from the Western transition from industrial to post-industrial society, one of the key context factors for the emergence of a new, or post-industrial, radical right (Ignazi 1992: 3-34; Betz 1994; Minkenberg 1997a). The transformation process is a multiple modernization process, i.e. the transitions to a liberal democracy and to market capitalism along with elements of a change from industrialism to post-industrialism, which often involves aspects of simultaneous nation- and state-building as well. As a result, the radical right combines post-industrial aspects such as the use of modern mass media, issue politics, and the decreasing role of mass (party) organizations with the ideologies of a particular past, i.e. the mix of traditional nationalism in the East and the legacy of state socialism.

Regarding the region-specific varieties of right-wing radical ideologies and historical references, the experience of state socialism and the lack of any long-lasting democratic practice must be taken into account. In fact, it has been suggested to create new typologies of right-wing radical parties in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, by classifying them according to the origins of their ideological identity as pre-Communist, Communist and post-Communist extreme-right parties (ERP) (Mudde 2000a: 5-27; Shafir 2000: 247-267). But characterizing such parties according to their historical origins does not automatically translate into ideological types. Radical or extreme right
parties which emerged in Eastern Europe after 1989 may or may not have a strong longing for some part of the country's past, they may focus on current issues and cultivate the (re-invented) nationalist image of some part of the country's non-democratic past. That is, the categories of pre- and post-Communist ERPs seem ideologically unspecified.

Therefore, the comparative classificatory scheme which is used here will distinguish between "historical" and "contemporary" types of right-wing radical thought with the historical type referring to undemocratic regimes of a country's past, such as fascist-autocratic or national-communist and the contemporary types employing ideological and issue elements from past and present, distinguished by the focus on ethnocentrism or racism on the one hand, and religious fundamentalism on the other. At first glance, most of these parties exhibit clear tendencies of authoritarian and anti-democratic orientations, which would justify classifying them as fascist-autocratic in the sense outlined above, and of racist and/or antisemitic attitudes with the lines between biological racism and ethnocentric views being blurred (Minkenberg 2002).

We therefore use two distinctions to classify right-wing radicalist groups. On the one side, distinguishing by the type of organization, we take a look at political parties, social movement organizations and subcultural milieus. On the other side, we try to identify the major ideological core of the group, establishing the categories (1) fascist-autocratic, (2) communist-nationalist, (3) ethnocentric/racist, and (4) religious–fundamentalist. Whereas the first two types are mainly historically related, the latter two have their main focus on current affairs. Since there are many interdependencies, the categories are not hermetically shielded from each other.

In Russia, for example, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) plays the dominant role on the right and falls into the categories of fascist-autocratic and ethnocentrist/racist. Its leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky entertains relationships with the French intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite as well as with Jean-Marie Le Pen and Gerhard Frey (Revlin 1999: 138-156). Also Gennadii Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation, by far the most important of today's Russian parties, with its blend of Russian imperialism and nationalist reinterpretation of Stalinism falls into the category of the radical right, as some observers argue (Williams/Hanson 1999: 257-277; Shenfield 2000). In Romania, easily identifiable right-wing radical parties for some time formed a government with the successor party of Ceaușescu's communist party. Among these are the Party for Greater Romania, PRM, which is characterized by an openly antisemitic and xenophobic, i.e. particularly anti-Hungarian and anti-Roma, ideology coupled with an anti-democratic and anti-Western doctrine. This is derived from a glorification of the Partida Nacionala, a nationalist movement of the 1830s, the fascist ideology of the Iron Guards, and the Communist past under Ceaușescu. This party clearly falls into several cells except the religious–fundamentalist one (Shafir 2000: 247-267).

The Polish situation is characterized by the peculiarity that next to ethnocentrist parties and groups, such as the National Front Party of the Fatherland (Stronnictwo Narodowe
'Ojczyzna', SN) with an explicitly anti-Semitic and anti-German platform and an orientation at the nationalist ideas of Roman Dmowski of the interwar period, there is also a clerical-nationalist (or religious-fundamentalist) party. The Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe, ZChN) advocates that Catholic dogma should be the basis of Polish politics and claims to embrace the interest of ethnic Poles in all of Eastern Europe. In the Czech Republic, the most important party on the radical right are the Republicans (Sdružení pro republiku - Republikánská strana Ceskoslovenska, SPR-RNC), founded in 1989 and led by Miroslav Sladek. This party, modeled after the Russian LDPR and the German Republikaner, is openly xenophobic and the only Czech party, which does not accept the secession of Slovakia. Its dreams of an "ethnically pure" greater Czechoslovakia (comprising only Slavic people) are combined with visions of a paternalistic and corporatist, i.e. authoritarian, state. The Hungarian radical right is dominated by István Czurka's Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP) which espouses antisemitic and biological-nativist views and advocates a recovery of the old Hungarian territory which now belongs to Romania, Ukraine, Serbia, and Slovakia, thus refusing to accept the treaty of Trianon of 1919 which settled the current borders between Hungary and its neighbor states. Although Czurka claims to be non-antisemitic, he shares with openly anti-Jewish Neo-Nazis the goal to expose what he sees as a worldwide Judeo-liberal-cosmopolitan conspiracy, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and George Soros. In both the Hungarian and Czech cases, the major parties of the radical right can be characterized as a mix between fascist-autocratic and ethnocentriracist groups (see the various contributions to Ramet 1999). In the movement sector, the group Pamyat (Remembrance) played an important role in the last days of the Soviet Union. There are numerous Nazi organizations in Russia, one of which, the Werewolves, officially support the National Socialist ideology but dissolved when its leaders were arrested in 1994. In the mid-1990s, experts counted some 30 extreme right organizations in Russia, with the Russian National Unity (Russkoe Narional'noe Edinstvo, RNE) being the biggest and best organized. According to one estimate, the RNE has attracted around 6,000 hard core, armed members and 30,000-50,000 active non-member supporters (Parfenov/Sergeeva 1998: 34). Likewise in Romania, there is a visible and active movement sector. Most prominent is Vatra Romaneasca, the Romanian Cradle, which became known by its violent activities against ethnic minorities, especially the sizable Hungarian group, right after the end of the old regime and has been considered an extra-parliamentary arm of PUNR. The Polish case also reveals a strong and partially violent movement sector of groups, which act and mobilize support in the pre-institutional arenas. One of the larger groups, the neofascist movement Polish Nationalist Union (Polska Wspólnota Narodowa: Polskie Stronnictwo Narodowe, PWN-PSN), led by Borestaw Tejkovski, counts about 4,000 members and became known internationally by its attacks on Jewish property and the Catholic church in 1991 and 1992. Moreover, since the mid-1990s, the ultra-Catholic radio station Radio Maryja has attracted millions of listeners and followers, mainly poor retired workers, unemployed and all kinds of “transformation losers”, with its mix of religious, anti-modernist, nationalist and
xenophobic, at times also antisemitic messages (Gluchowski 1999: 70-74). Beyond these organizations, there is a growing right-wing extremist scene of violent groups and Nazi skinheads. In many Polish towns, meetings of several hundred militants are rather frequent events, as are anti-Semitic or fascist graffiti on buildings. Also in the Czech Republic, there is a visible scene of violence-prone right-wing extremists who often choose as their target Roma people and can count on some sympathy from their fellow citizens. Like in Poland and in Hungary, the Roma are a widely rejected ethnic minority (Jenne 2000: 189-212). Between 1990 and 1998, a total of 21 people have died in the Czech Republic as a result of racist attacks, which taking into account the country’s population size, sharply exceeds the level of racist violence in neighboring Germany (Penc/Urbán 1998: 39-40).

Emergence of right-wing radicalism in post-socialist societies: towards a model of analysis

After having outlined the ideological and organizational shape of right-wing radicalism in post-socialist Europe and interpreted it as a reaction to modernization shifts, here in the form of regime transformation, we now proceed to identify the crucial variables in the region’s "opportunity structures" for radical right-wing mobilization. These variables are derived from the general concept of right-wing radicalism, as outlined earlier, and the particular nature of regime transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. With these, we attempt to provide the sketch of an analytical model which helps understanding the region-specific communalities and cross-national variations of the radical right in transformation countries in terms of ideological contours, organizational features, political strength and input into the process of democratization. Opportunity structures here are understood as "consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political [and social] environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (Rucht 1994: 294ff; Tarrow 1994). It is important to stress that opportunity structures provide resources for collective action, which are beyond the control of the actors themselves. Thus defined, they are much more than specific electoral systems (such as proportional representation), regime structures (such as federalism), or laws, which regulate public activities (such as anti-racist laws in France, Germany, or Poland). It lies in the very nature of systems undergoing transformation, that regime structures and systems of interest mediation are still being negotiated. Thus we suggest to identify as the most crucial components of the radical right’s opportunity structures of nation-building and nationalism on the one hand, and conflicts and cleavages resulting from the transformation process such as the regime conflict itself and the level of "transformation costs", on the other.

Historical and cultural conditions: Nation-building and nationalism

One of the most important aspects of any collective mobilization rests in the "cultural
resonance” of particular issues as a condition for the possibility of mobilization. Our concept of right-wing radicalism as populist ultranationalism suggests that the type of nation, which exists in a given society, is particularly relevant. It is possible to situate types of nations – “imagined communities” in Benedict Anderson’s term (Anderson 1983: 160) – in modern European history along the dimension of demos versus ethnos and to summarize them in three distinct types, according to the degree of openness/closeness of criteria of membership in the nation (Meinecke 1908; Alter 1985; Brubaker 1992): a political nation in which the belief in common political values and institutions in a well-defined territory dominates; a cultural nation in which the belief in cultural, especially religious, characteristics, irrespective of the political design, dominates; and an ethnic nation in which the belief in a shared culture is accompanied by the belief that one can only be a member by being born into this national community, or a belief in the “natural”, i.e. biological, roots of a nation.

Contrary to many cases of Western nation-building, most Eastern European nations did not emerge in conjunction with a bourgeois revolution, a strong liberal movement or the establishment of liberal democracy. Nation-building in Western Europe followed mainly a trajectory in which a "political nation" had emerged and combined with some cultural or ethnic aspects. As is well known, the German path to national unity and the subsequent national identity diverges from this "Western model" by its heavy emphasis on the German Kultur nation which after unification in 1871 resulted in the myth of an ethnic community of Germans, or Volksnation (ethnic nation). In Eastern Europe, political nation-building occurred later or was blocked while nationalism took on a distinct cultural or ethnic flavor.

It has been argued that this juxtaposition makes little, if any, sense (Auer 2000: 213-245). However, ignoring the relevance of particular historical trajectories of nation-building or democratization in certain parts of Europe seems overly ahistorical. At the time when in Western Europe the processes of nation-building entered a phase of consolidation and liberalization (the last third of the 19th century), almost all of Eastern Europe was subject to multinational empires, i.e. the Habsburg, the Russian and the Ottoman empires (Szücs 1990). Nation-building here was always of the risorgimento type (Alter 1985), directed against the existing order and dependent upon its collapse. The dates of national independence were 1881 for Romania, 1882 for Serbia, 1908 for Bulgaria and 1919 for all the others. Russia, of course, stands out as a particular case where the imperial tradition added a significant political component to Russian nationhood. Apart from Russia, however, the dominant pattern was the emergence of a national identity without the nation-state, i.e. an ethnic nationhood, and the establishment of a nation-state along with democratization after World War I, i.e. in the context of the first wave of democratization (Huntington 1991).

In this context, many post-socialist nations can be characterized by a "triadic" configuration of nations between nation-building processes, the existence of national minorities within the new states, and the existence of "external homelands" (Brubaker
1997). While the role of "external homelands" or "lost territories" has not been a central feature in the analysis of right-wing radicalism, the literature often focuses on the importance of ethnic minorities and related conflicts. If there exist strong national minorities (more than 3% of the population), it may be expected that "real" conflicts emerge concerning language, education and other minority issues. Here, radical right-wing forces can benefit most easily from such a cleavage. Another dimension in which the minority issue plays a role is the existence of external national homelands. The identification with populations of the same nation living outside the actual borders of the nation-state is a mobilizing argument for ultranationalist, especially revisionist groups. Because all larger countries including Russia propagate that existing state borders cannot be touched within Europe, those countries with such external homelands provide the radical right with a particular issue, which they can use against the establishment. It is in this arena, where the process of nation-building might well override other issues and thus help explain more than other factors the mobilization of right-wing radicalism (Stein 2000). In countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and others, constitutional conflicts which damage the process of democratic consolidation have developed around issues which, in the absence of such minorities would not have entered the political agenda: the attempts to ban ethnic parties, citizenship and language laws, issues of territorial autonomy and education.

Modernization and Regime Change

As mentioned before, regime transition here is understood as a modernizing process but in a more profound and encompassing way than in West European societies in the entire post-war period. These changes include the demise of state socialism and with it the discrediting of its regime ideology, the simultaneous political and economic transformation and a high level of social disorientation and ambivalence towards the new order. This is evident, for example, in that the development of political cultures in Central and Eastern Europe diverges from the West with regard to market values and values of authority (Inglehart 1997: 93). Only the Czech Republic exhibited early signs of a "civic culture" with relatively high and stable levels of "system affect" and the forming of pluralistic principles (Jacobs/Pickel 2001).

In all socialist states there have been tendencies of compensating the weak legitimacy of the regime by bringing up national issues, thus seeking to enhance political legitimization via a recourse to national traditions. But the extent to which it worked varies greatly between cases of limited success, for example, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and especially the GDR on the one hand, and those with larger resonance, like Romania and Yugoslavia, on the other. According to the development of the regime transition and the consolidation of democracy, one must distinguish between countries in which the conflict about the nature of the new regime has been settled (such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and the Baltic states) and those where it has not. In the latter ones, right-wing radical positions can effectively be tied to the ongoing struggle over the regime,
especially the (positive) evaluation of the state socialist past. Here, it can be assumed that national-communist traditions – where they have existed – continue to have an effect, and it is no surprise that only in those countries where the regime conflict has not yet been overcome, one can observe an ideological closeness, if not cooperation, between communist and nationalists (Ishiyama 1998: 61-85). Socialist parties without real efforts to reform their programs to a pro-democratic direction are still enriching their ideologies with nationalist issues. Thus, a direct link exists between the "communist nationalism" (Shenfield 2000: 81) of the socialist period and potentially right-wing radical positions in the post-communist period. In countries where the former communist parties underwent a thorough change, the distance to the socialist ideology implies a break with the national communist tradition as well.

Modernization and Cleavage Structures

Overall, the Central and Eastern European cleavage structures differ markedly from those in Western democracies. In Central and Eastern Europe, all cleavages are new (or renewed) and must be seen in the context of the transformation process. If Lipset and Rokkan's "freezing hypothesis" was already questionable for Western party systems in the 1970s and 1980s, then it is even more difficult to apply to Eastern Europe. The party systems were short-lived and unstable in the 1920s, and the one-party regimes that followed the war eradicated the feeble cleavage structures that might have existed. Traditional or newly salient cleavages have taken over the role of structuring party competition only in those countries where the most dominant issue, the regime conflict between supporters of the old regime and supporters of the new order, was resolved and democratic consolidation had advanced. The settlement of the regime conflict is defined by a situation in which all relevant political forces clearly prefer the democratic regime to the former socialist one. During the 1990s, this has been the case only in Central Europe (including the Baltic states) with the exception of Slovakia (Beichelt 2001).

Most research on party systems in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe identify some central cleavages such as the one between forces which promote the ideas of market liberalism and those which favor political redistribution, or between modernizers and opponents to modernization (Kitschelt 1992: 7-50; Plasser/Ulram/Waldrach 1997; Stöss/Segert 1997: 379-428). But there is disagreement about the number and characteristics of other cleavages, which are not related to the first one, and where to situate parties of the radical right. For example, Plasser et al. suggest to consider two more crosscutting cleavages, one between transformation losers and transformation winners and another one between orientations of self-reliance and the need for guidance. But self-reliers, transformation winners and market liberals do not appear sufficiently distinct as a basis for different cleavages. On the other hand, Glaßner suggests to condense all conflict types into one between “structural conservatives” (incl. ex-communists, nationalists, social populists etc.) and “modernizers” (market liberals, forum parties etc.) (Stöss/Segert 1997: 400). This approach, however, oversimplifies the
conflict structure and overlooks the variety of cleavages within and across countries.

Thus, the idea of a dual modernization conflict along a socioeconomic axis and along a sociocultural or value-related axis seems more persuasive because of the distinct logical and historical differences of the two cleavages (Beichelt 2001: chap. 4). For the case of Central and Eastern Europe, Kitschelt and collaborators have adjusted an earlier model to the context of transformation and redefined the two main cleavages as one between market liberals and social protectionists on the one hand, and secular libertarians and religious authoritarians on the other (Kitschelt u.a. 1999). The socioeconomic cleavage is by and large defined by the conflict about the introduction of market liberalism and their opponents who seem to benefit increasingly from the historically unprecedented depth of the current economic crisis in many countries on the one hand, and those "modernization losers" who suffer from the increasing transformation costs on the other (Milanovic 1998). If right-wing radicalism is understood as a reaction to those modernization processes, the extent of transformation costs can be seen as a major factor influencing its emergence. A possible measure of these costs, as induced by the rapid socioeconomic transformation, can be derived from indicators about the change (increase) of socioeconomic inequality and the change (increase) of real income since the onset of the transformation.

The sociocultural dimension of modernization is seen in the extent of secularization on the one hand; both as a result of the politics of state socialist regimes and a consequence of regime change itself, and the dominant values of authority and well-being on the other (Inglehart 1998). In some countries, for example Poland and Romania, religiosity is still unusually strong, others have undergone a process of "de-churching", such as the Czech Republic and Estonia (Pollack/Borowik/Jagodzinski 1998). The level of religiosity and the conflict between religious and secular groups or between “value types” can be expected to exert an influence on the mobilization of the radical right.

The structure of right-wing radicalism in post-socialist Europe: testing the model regarding parties and party systems

Following these thoughts about conceptualizing an explanatory model for the emergence of right-wing radicalism in post-socialist transformation countries along the lines of historical and political-cultural conflict, regime conflict, and cleavage structures, here summarized as "opportunity structures" for radical right-wing mobilization, we arrive at the following table for our selected countries (see table 1).

The following highlights some characteristics of the cases in table 1. As suggested by this model, the countries under consideration dispose of different opportunity structures for the emergence of right-wing radicalism. Due to the resistance to the Ottoman Empire (political sphere) and the guidance of the Greek orthodox church (sociocultural sphere) Bulgaria has clearly developed a cultural nation, which since the late 19th century was
organized independently even if official independence from Ottoman rule only came in 1909. The possible roots of right-wing radicalism have to be seen mainly in the conflict structure of today's society, which manifest themselves in the ongoing regime conflict in conjunction with the existence of an easily identifiable (Turkish) minority. This pattern can also be observed in some neighboring countries, notably Moldova, Romania and Slovakia. The minority issue in these countries tends to be included in the regime conflict, with post-socialist forces instrumentalizing ethnic interests in the battle against handing over the power to "democrats", that is against minority rights and against full fledged Western capitalism. In contrast to Bulgaria, Romania should be seen as an ethnic nation, in particular because of the cultivation of Romanian ethnicity under the fascist-autocratic Antonescu and the communist-nationalist Ceaușescu regimes at the expense of the Hungarian minority in Western Romania – a conflict which is still carried on today.

Table 1: Analytic framework for right-wing radical mobilization potential in post-socialist Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Historical and cultural conditions</th>
<th>Relevant cleavage variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall degree of modernization (transformation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nation type (main mode of reference)</td>
<td>Existence of external national homelands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>In-flux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) A minimum of 3% of the population.
(c) A measure derived from church going statistics and value orientations (Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and the Persistence of Traditional Value Systems: Empirical Evidence from 61
The Slovak and Czech Republics seem to be similar cases as a result of their common history until the 1993 partition. However, the two countries’ conditions are quite different. The revival of Czech culture and ethnic nationalism in the 19th century referred to Bohemia mainly. Tomas Masaryk's — himself a Slovak — argument of Czechs and Slovaks constituting a joint nation was politically motivated and first aimed at constituting an autonomous province within the Habsburg Empire. The only period of reference for an independent Slovakia is the clerical-fascist regime of Jozef Tiso 1939-1945. The Velvet divorce of 1993, then, changed a lot more for the Slovaks than for the Czechs. The Slovaks whose majority opposed the divorce (Vodicka 1994: 175-186) had to reorient themselves both politically and culturally. Moreover, they were faced with a problem the Czechs do not have anymore, the Hungarian minority. All this helps explain why the Czechs were able to overcome the regime conflict very quickly whereas Vladimir Mecliar's party, the HZDS, had to rely to a much stronger extent on the old elites of the Czechoslovak Republic, especially at the subnational level.

The remaining countries are all characterized by the fact that the regime conflict has been largely resolved. Estonia gained independence in the early 1990s but experienced a period of statehood between the wars. The rule by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and the deliberate migration of Russians to Estonia during the entire Soviet period left deep traces and fostered a clearly ethnic sense of nationhood in Estonia. Its whole political sphere is marked by the elite's will to escape Russian power as much and as soon as possible; there is no regime conflict but an unusual elite consensus concerning political and economic questions. In Hungary, a cultural sense of nation developed under the auspices of the dual monarchy. Then, however, due to the treaty of Trianon, the country lost two thirds of its former territory with several millions of Hungarian living outside their native state all of a sudden. The question of external homelands heavily burdened the interwar regime and eventually lead to an authoritarian regime with fascist traits. Therefore, defining oneself as Hungarian today has a strong ethnic ring (Fischer 1999: 138-146). The Polish nation is marked by a strong sense of cultural nationhood. The main contributing factors include the long history of partition and foreign rule, the role of the Catholic church in providing a focus of national identity, and the results of World War II, in particular the territorial and population shift to the West and the disappearance of ethnic minorities (Davies 2000: 292-295). In Poland, the character of the inter-war regime seems to be more heavily debated than in some other Central European states where authoritarian rulers took over the weak democracies in the inter-war period. The antagonism between pro-Russian Roman Dmowski and anti-Russian Jozef Pilsudski experienced a revival after 1989 (Stankiewicz 2001).
Table 2: Opportunity structures and right-wing radical electoral potential in post-socialist Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation type</th>
<th>Opportunity structures</th>
<th>Electoral potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Existence of external homelands</td>
<td>Regime conflict: Regime Contested by Major Political Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Existence of a strong national minority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (1997, 2001)</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (1995, 1999)</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (1994, 1998)</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic (1996, 1998)</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (1994, 1998)</td>
<td>In flux</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1997, 2001)</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (1995, 1999)</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (1996, 2000)</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Average result of the last two elections until end of 2000 in national parliamentary elections.
(b) Parties included: Romania: PDSR, Russia: KPRF.
(c) Parties included: Czech Republic: SPR-RS, Hungary: MIÉP; Poland: ROP, Samoobrona, Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR); Slovakia: SNS, Romania: PUNR, PRM, Russia: LDPR.
(d) The 5.6% of 1997 (ROP) is probably an underestimate because right-wing radical groups (KPN, ZChN) ran on the AWS ticket.
(e) For classification see table 1 and text above.
In the final part of this section, we now want to subject this model to a first empirical test. Our approach as developed so far consists mainly of two parts: a) modernization processes are at the base of generating right-wing radicalism, and b) country-specific opportunity structures are decisive in structuring the emerging radical right which can arise in the form of parties, social movement organizations and subcultural milieus. However, since there is hardly any available data on the movement and milieu dimension of right-wing radicalism in the region, this test will be applied to the level of the parties and party systems. This means that our hypothesis cannot be tested completely.

The selection of variables of the opportunity structures is directly related to the analytic framework in table 1. Those, which have been identified as facilitating the emergence of the radical right, are shaded. Because of the near empirical overlap of the levels of socioeconomic and sociocultural transformation costs, these dimensions have been merged. Our dependent variable here is the right-wing radical election potential, as measured in the average vote for such parties in the last two national parliamentary elections. The measurement of this potential should also take into account cases where, due to the role of “communist nationalism” in state socialism, non-reformed post-communist parties may add to the potential. The results of the analysis are shown in table 2.

The overall empirical findings reveal some patterns while also allowing for striking peculiarities. In general, in cases with more than two facilitating variables the radical right can count on higher levels of electoral support. This is true for the Czech Republic and Hungary where right-wing radical parties only play a minor role, and for Romania and Russia, where strong right-wing radical groups coexist with communist nationalist parties. This leads to a second important finding. Countries with a strong pre-1989 communist-nationalist tradition seem to produce the fascist-autocratic variant of right-wing radicalism as the major party type. Here, the radical right does have a problematic effect on the development of democracy. Due to the interplay of the radical right and the post-communist left, a "Weimarization" of these regimes remains a possible path of the future. While in Russia the election of Putin seems to have slowed down this process, the Romanian presidential elections of 2000, with the former Ceaușescu-ally Iliescu and the fascist-autocratic Tudor taking a large share of the votes, continued the trend. Thirdly, racist or ethnocentrist types of right-wing radical parties dominate the scene in the cases where democracy has taken root. This raises the question whether these parties are "catching up" with Western European cases. But unlike most Western European cases, these parties’ leaders and platforms advocate more backwards-looking ideologies, notably with regard to “lost territories”, open antisemitism and anti-democratic sentiments (Minkenberg 2002).

In light of these general patterns, the cases of Estonia and especially Bulgaria are striking in that they contain rather favorable opportunity structures but obviously no right-wing radical electoral potential. Clearly, Bulgaria is the odd case in our sample. Based on our model, we would expect a large electoral potential for the radical right, but the findings
point to the opposite. One reason could be that the political bloc of the right still exhibits characteristics of a movement organization with low levels of programmatic coherence. The recent electoral success of the former monarch Simeon II. underlines the fluidity of the electorate as well the very weak structuring of the party system. The absence of any right-wing radical party in Estonia despite the highly publicized discrimination of the Russian ethnic minority might be attributed to the precarious situation of the country vis-à-vis its Russian neighbour. Any open right-wing radical political activities are bound to provoke Russian counter-action the threat of which pushes even nationalists towards embracing Western ideas and integration. Contrary to these two cases, the Polish situation seems reversed in that comparatively unfavorable opportunity structures have allowed for a rather sizable support for the radical right. Here, low levels of formal structuring of the political right and in particular the ambiguous role of the Catholic church and its lack of a critical position towards antisemitism seem to play into the hands of ultranationalist political entrepreneurs.

Conclusions

A comparative study of right-wing radicalism in post-socialist Europe cannot be restricted to describing the phenomenon in a country-by-country fashion. Because of the wide range of national characteristics of the countries and the variations of post-communist pathways, an analytic framework is needed to put the differences into perspective and to raise questions about the relationship between some underlying communalities and the diverging contours and strengths of the radical right. As our analysis suggests, modernization theory presents a good point of departure. A more elaborate concept of modernization, which is not restricted to socioeconomic elements, allows for additional insights by focusing on historical-cultural as well as economic prerequisites and patterns of change, its carriers and opponents. In contrast to Western Europe, these opponents are able to combine radical right-wing ideology with the rudiments of "communist nationalism" and, depending on the cleavage structures, achieve relatively high levels of electoral success – to the detriment of the democratization process. Our model also suggests that in some countries, certain independent variables play a more significant role in explaining the outcome than in others, for example the nation type in Poland, external homelands in Hungary, the regime conflict in Romania. On the other hand and quite like in Western Europe, the size of ethnic minorities does not directly correlate with the size of electoral support for the radical right.

But our model of analysis is not restricted to party systems and voting patterns alone. Instead, it allows for a more comprehensive view of the phenomenon of the radical right, comprising party organizations, movements and subcultural (and violent) milieus. Here, much more research needs to be done to test the entire model and to assess the relationships between the variants of ideological and organizational types. The Western European, and especially the German, experience suggests that in cases where right-wing radical parties have not formed or are only weakly anchored and organized, movement-
type groups and activities, including racist violence, are more pronounced. There are
already some indications that this might also apply to our sample, as the reports of radical
right-wing activity and violence in countries like the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary
suggest.

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